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Abstract 
 
A growing number of security policies are based on access to and exchange of personal data, 
frequently with an international scope. While transatlantic measures generally include the 
EU as a single actor, the last two years have seen a proliferation of bilateral agreements 
between the US and individual EU member states. These agreements usually seek to extend 
abroad a range of specific, internal security measures. 
This paper aims at studying the position of relevant actors and their capacity to increase their 
power or to quell resistance during the process of extra-territorialisation. The paper assumes 
as a hypothesis that the set-up of security policies is readable as a ‘plateau’, a transversal 
field in which actors’ ability to shape new configurations of actors and fields is a key asset 
for enhancing their relevance. The research investigates this hypothesis further by taking as a 
case study the conclusion, in March 2008, of a transatlantic agreement on data exchange 
between Germany and the US. The text of the agreement mirrors the wording of existing 
European instruments and thus seems to offer an appropriate occasion to analyse the process 
of extra-territorialisation of security policies. 
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PRÜM: A MODEL ‘PRÊT-À-EXPORTER’? 
THE 2008 GERMAN–US AGREEMENT 
ON DATA EXCHANGE 
ROCCO BELLANOVA
∗ 
Introduction 
The practice of collecting personal data is becoming ever more widespread nowadays. The 
ability to manage personal data is perceived as one of the cornerstones of further developments 
in a widening range of domains (Stocker & Schöpf, 2007, pp. 10–12). Its growing importance is 
becoming very visible in the commercial sphere: sectors ranging from transport management to 
the entertainment business are increasingly asking for and relying on personal data. Yet, 
practices based on personal data access are also spreading in the public sector. Notwithstanding 
that the collection, storage and exchange of data is not new in public administration (Bennett & 
Lyon, 2008), it could still be argued that the last few years have seen an outstanding diffusion of 
such policies. These policies frequently have an international dimension and they are legally 
based on international agreements or supranational legislation. Gaining access to data seems to 
offer a solution to a wide spectrum of modern needs, fears and perceived threats. In particular, 
in a world that can be understood as increasingly “liquid”
1 and interdependent, accessing data 
could appear as the best way to secure mobility (Stirling-Belin, 2005; Ceyhan, 2005) and thus 
addressing, if not preventing, its related perceived threats: terrorism and transnational organised 
crime.
2 
The US is generally perceived as the main promoter of these security measures, and explicitly 
or implicitly, of their proliferation in different foreign systems. This has notably been the case 
for the passenger name record (PNR), a US initiative aimed at accessing the travel data of all 
passengers of US-related flights.
3 At the same time, EU countries are actively proposing 
                                                      
∗ Rocco Bellanova is with the Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis/CReSPo, Vrije Universiteit 
Brussel/LSTS. This study is based on a working paper presented at the WISC Conference of July 2008 at 
the University of Ljubljana: Accessing Personal Data for Security Purposes: Establishing Flows of Data 
and Shaping Actors and Fields Relations. This version has been partially re-elaborated and enriched by 
the analysis of new documentation and a series of interviews. The author would like to thank Natalia 
Dasilva and Denis Duez for their valuable advice, Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera for their comments as 
well as all the European and national officials who provided comments and documentation. 
1 “Opening the way to the nomadic traffic and removing the few remaining blocks is, nowadays, the main 
goal of politics, as well as of wars” (Z. Bauman, Modernità liquida, Roma-Bari: Laterza, 2002, p. 10). 
2 “The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external 
aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 
European Security Strategy, presented by J. Solana, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 2). The European 
security strategy is based on the perception of an increasingly interconnected world, and it identifies 
among the key threats both terrorism and organised crime (pp. 3–5). 
3 Access to PNR data by security agencies was first the object of a series of agreements between the EU 
and the US (the latest being the 2007 EU–US Agreement, OJ L 204, 4.8.2007). Then it was partially 
introduced in agreements between the EU and Canada (2005 EU–Canada Agreement, OJ L 82/15, 
21.3.2006) and between the EU and Australia (Council of the European Union, Draft Council Decision 
on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement between the European Union and 
Australia on the processing and transfer of EU-sourced passenger name record (PNR) data by air carriers 2 | ROCCO BELLANOVA 
 
security measures based on data access. Since the drafting of the compensatory measures to the 
Schengen Treaty (OJ L 176, 10.07.1999) or the establishment of EURODAC (OJ L 316, 
15.12.2000), political discussions and legislative proposals have focused on creating databases,
4 
on exchanging information among law enforcement agencies
5 and on collecting data by 
electronic communication.
6 More specifically, since the launch of the Hague Programme in 
2004 (OJ C 53, 3.3.2005, pp. 1–14), data access has become a major issue and a driving force in 
the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Furthermore, as this paper argues, 
European ministries of justice and interior affairs, with the support of foreign affairs ministries, 
are becoming very proactive in spreading such security measures at the international level. 
Finally, it is important to recall that at the transatlantic level, the conclusion of international 
agreements on access to data such as PNR or financial data (Council of the European Union, 
2007d), seems to have not only an intrinsic value as a tool in the so-called ‘fight against 
terrorism’, but also a highly political value as a form of external cooperation (Council of the 
European Union, 2008a). 
1.  Hypothesis and case study 
This study aims at analysing the position of relevant actors and their capacity to increase their 
powers or to quell resistance during the process of extra-territorialisation of security measures 
based on data access.
7 It deals with the process of extra-territorialisation of the Prüm Treaty, a 
European set of security measures enhancing, inter alia, the exchange of personal data. Given 
the series of legal instruments developed on the basis of the Prüm Treaty provisions, the paper 
questions the creation of a ‘Prüm model’ and analyses its features in order to outline and discuss 
a possible model of extra-territorialisation. 
                                                                                                                                                           
to the Australian Customs Service, Doc. 9508/1/08 REV 1, Brussels, 2008(c)). It has also been echoed by 
a European Commission proposal (European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision 
on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purposes, 2007/0237 (CNS), Brussels, 
2007). 
4 See the Regulation on the development of the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) 
of 6 December 2001, (EC) No. 2424/2001, OJ L 328, 13.12.2001. See also European Commission, 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the Visa 
Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas, 
COM(2004) 835, Brussels, 2004; and European Commission,  Proposal for a Council Decision 
concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by the authorities of Member 
States responsible for internal security and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and 
investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences, COM(2005) 0600 final, 
Brussels, 2005(a). 
5 See for example the so-called ‘Swedish proposal’: Council of the European Union, Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence 
between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 386, 29.12.2006 
(2006a, pp. 89–100). 
6 See Council of the European Union, Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, OJ L 105 13.04.2006 (2006b). 
7 The process of extra-territorialisation is defined in this study as the extension or the diffusion of the 
same or a similar measure in other legal settings. THE 2008 GERMAN–US AGREEMENT ON DATA EXCHANGE | 3 
 
The conclusion of an international agreement between Germany and the US on the exchange of 
personal data offers an interesting and challenging case study.
8 It is the first case in which a 
security measure initially developed within the European context has been ‘exported’ to the US. 
Furthermore, in the months following the conclusion of the US–Germany Agreement, other EU 
member states signed similar agreements, creating a sort of ‘ping-pong’ effect of extra-
territorialisation and confirming the idea that some actors have the ability to propose security 
measures as a response to other actors’ non-security needs, such as admission to the US Visa 
Waiver Program (VWP). Lastly, given its geographical scope and wording based on intra-
European and EU legal instruments, it provides scholars with the possibility to analyse how 
measures are set up and promoted in different fields, how measures change and the resulting 
potential impact in terms of power shifts and protection of fundamental rights.  
The research assumes as a hypothesis that the set up of security measures is readable as a 
plateau, a transversal field in which actors’ ability to shape new configurations of actors and 
fields is a key asset to enhancing their relevance.
9 The most successful actors are those who can 
easily create new fields, move across the existing ones as well as generate multiple initiatives 
and different alliances in order to retain a reference position in several fields. Therefore, 
addressing such a hypothesis implies the analysis of how security measures are established: the 
context, the main actors and fields involved, their relations, the content of the measures and 
where the increase of power or resistance occurs. 
Such a study should also provide initial insight into the main risks and distortions generated in 
the course of power struggles among actors. This seems especially important, because security 
measures based on data access tend to give rise to criticism and issues. Among these are 
questions of the relations of European institutions and the process of Europeanization as well as 
the safeguard of fundamental rights and data protection. 
2.  Towards a Prüm model? 
On 11 March 2008, the Federal Republic of Germany and the US signed an international 
agreement on enhancing cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime. 
This agreement provides for the exchange of a wide range of personal data, notably including 
fingerprints, DNA and other sensitive data. As stated in the preamble,
10 the agreement follows 
                                                      
8 See the Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government 
of the United States of America (Washington, D.C., 11 March 2008) on enhancing cooperation in 
preventing and combating serious crime (hereafter ‘US–Germany Agreement’ or ‘transatlantic 
agreement’). 
9 This hypothesis is partially inspired by the reflection of U. Beck on the reinforcement of interior 
ministries’ powers through international cooperation among them (“The Terrorist Threat, World Risk 
Society Revisited”, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2002). It is also based on the notion of 
“champ” of P. Bourdieu (Risposte: per una antropologia riflessiva, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 1992, pp. 
66–83) and the “two-level game” theory of R.D. Putnam (“Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic 
of Two-Level Games”, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1988). Although the notion of 
‘plateau’ as expressed in this paper presents several differences from the concept of G. Deleuze and F. 
Guattari, there is a common point in the conception of a plateau as a sort of transversal field, including, 
overlapping and linking several different fields: “We define ‘plateau’ as any multiplicity which can be 
bonded to others through superficial subterranean roots, in a way to form and expand a rhizome” (Mille 
plateaux, Capitalisme et schizophrénie 2, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1980, p. 33). 
10 See para. 4. 4 | ROCCO BELLANOVA 
 
the example of the Treaty of Prüm
11 and thus seems to reinforce the idea of the success and 
diffusion of what could be called a ‘Prüm model’. 
In fact, since the conclusion of the Prüm Treaty in May 2005 (Council of the European Union, 
2005), some governments have been promoting the Prüm Convention as an EU-wide tool to be 
formally proposed and adopted within the EU framework. Simultaneous with the adoption of 
some aspects of the Convention under EU law, has been the further promotion of the Prüm 
Treaty as a model, this time within the transatlantic framework. Meanwhile, and despite some 
provisions being on course for adoption at the EU level, several member states have joined the 
‘Prüm club’ and others have declared their interest.
12 The reasons for this rather astonishing 
success seem to lie especially in the proactive role of the German government – and a strong 
continuity between two governments and two interior ministers of different political 
orientations – as well as in the appeal of its provisions. Moreover, since its very beginning the 
Prüm Treaty and its EU transposition has been a major issue not only of the debate on police 
cooperation and data exchange (EDPS, 2006 and 2007), but also of Europeanization and its 
values and rules (Apap & Vasiliu, 2006; Balzacq, 2006a and 2006b). 
Given such an interesting history and EU-wide implications, as well as its strong echoes in the 
US–Germany Agreement, it is worth advancing a rough analysis of what could be the Prüm 
model. A tentative draft can offer insight into the issues of international police cooperation and 
the extra-territorialisation of security measures. Additionally, it can provide a first overview of 
the new configuration between power and resistance. Finally, it aims at assessing the possible 
consistency of the initial assumption of the working paper and stimulating further analysis and 
discussion. 
In order to sketch the features of the Prüm model, the rest of the paper compares the contexts 
and the contents of three instruments, identifies the main actors and analyses some key 
provisions. It offers an initial overview of the resistance already encountered by the agreement 
and some concluding remarks. 
3.  Contexts: Transition periods? 
All the Prüm-based instruments have been discussed and concluded in a mixed context, made 
up of institutional pushes and discussions towards integration and political statements as well as 
speeches on the so-called ‘variable geometry approach’ (Dehousse et al., 2004 and Dehousse & 
Sifflet, 2006). The Treaty was signed merely two days before the French referendum on the 
European Constitution, and the German initiative (General Secretariat of the Council, 2007b) 
was presented at the same time as the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty. Both initiatives have 
been presented as an opportunity for achieving greater European cooperation, and even if this 
concept has been challenged by numerous critics, it has frequently been used and accepted by 
policy-makers at the European and national levels. 
                                                      
11 See the “Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of 
Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the 
Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, 
cross-border crime and illegal migration” (‘Treaty of Prüm’), (Prüm, 27 May 2005), hereafter also 
‘Convention’ and ‘Treaty’. 
12 Italy was the first non-Prüm country to sign a declaration of intent to join the group (Repubblica 
Italiana, Dichiarazione di intenzione di adesione al Trattato di Prüm, Berlino, Berlin, 2006). It was 
followed by three other countries by the end of 2006: Slovenia, Portugal and Finland. During the first 
months of 2007, at least other three further member states asked to join – Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Romania. Among them, Hungary and Finland had already signed the agreement by the end of 2007. THE 2008 GERMAN–US AGREEMENT ON DATA EXCHANGE | 5 
 
The conclusion of the negotiations on the US–Germany Agreement occurred in the background 
of a transition period in Europe, related to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and its process of 
ratification. Besides the purely ‘internal’ European aspects of transition, the context of 
transatlantic relations between the US and EU member states and institutions is relevant. In the 
recent years, measures concerning data access have climbed up the transatlantic agenda. 
Security and visa issues are among the main topics of discussion at both the international level, 
with US pursuing an active policy of further data access and bilateral diplomacy, as well as the 
internal level, with a potential clash on the defence of member state and Commission 
prerogatives and powers. All the transatlantic agreements have provoked fierce struggles in the 
field of European institutions, as demonstrated by the PNR
13 and SWIFT dossiers, on both the 
content and the form. In 2008, the legitimacy of the European Commission as a leading actor in 
transatlantic relations was stressed between the activities of the High Level Contact Group 
(Council of the European Union, 2008d), paving the way to a possible, transatlantic data-
protection agreement (De Hert & Bellanova, 2008), and Eastern European member states 
negotiating bilateral agreements in order to enter into the US VWP.
14 Such a picture seems to 
confirm the idea that the US–Germany Agreement entered the transatlantic and European arenas 
at a very delicate moment. Therefore, in line with what had already happened at the time of the 
conclusion of the Prüm Treaty, the US–Germany Agreement and its promoters were 
immediately successful in its diffusion. Seven months later, the text of the US–Germany 
Agreement had been codified as a ‘standard transatlantic agreement’ between the US and non-
VWP EU member states.
15 
The first extra-territorialisation of (parts of) the Prüm Treaty into the EU framework and the 
subsequent ping-pong, transatlantic extra-territorialisation appear to confirm the idea that a 
prominent feature of the Prüm model is its ability to present itself as a quick and effective 
solution for international cooperation as well as a ‘prêt-à-exporter’ model. The idea of 
transposing the Prüm Treaty within the EU framework is already declared in the preamble and 
in the first article of the Convention.
16 It is now echoed by the preamble of the transatlantic 
                                                      
13 See the Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America (Washington, 
D.C., 28 May 2004) on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, OJ L 183/84, 20.5.2004. 
See also the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America (Luxembourg and 
Washington, D.C., 16–19 October 2006) on the processing and transfer of passenger name record (PNR) 
data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, OJ L 298/29, 27.10.2006. 
14 See the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic and 
the Department of Homeland Security of the United States of America (Prague, 26 February 2008) 
regarding the United States visa waiver program and related enhanced security measures. See also the 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Hungary and the Government of the United 
States of America (Budapest, 20 May 2008) for the Exchange of Screening Information concerning 
Known or Suspected Terrorists. 
15 At the time of writing, at least six other Eastern European member states have signed a similar 
agreement: Hungary, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
16 The 4
th para. of the Prüm Treaty Preamble states, “[s]eeking to have the provisions of this Convention 
brought within the legal framework of the European Union”, and then Art. 1(4) further defines the 
guidelines for transposition:  
Within three years at most following entry into force of this Convention, on the basis of an 
assessment of experience of its implementation, an initiative shall be submitted, in consultation 
with or on a proposal from the European Commission, in compliance with the provisions of the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, with the aim 
of incorporating the provisions of this Convention into the legal framework of the European 
Union. 6 | ROCCO BELLANOVA 
 
agreement (4
th para.). Both governments state their expectation that the agreement will be 
considered a model for similar future agreements (5
th para.). Apart from such a declaration, the 
European and transatlantic contexts themselves offer this transatlantic agreement the occasion 
to set the basic model. The active US diplomatic policy favouring bilateral agreements (such as 
the 2008 US–Czech Republic Memorandum of Understanding and the 2008 US–Hungary 
Agreement) on data access measures as well as the strong interest of Eastern European member 
states in taking part in the VWP provides fertile ground for reproducing the model. 
Furthermore, the previous adoption of a Prüm system at the EU level could push several 
member states towards adopting similar agreements at the transatlantic level. Obviously, such a 
political, juridical and diplomatic choice would have consequences for the conception and shape 
of transatlantic security and data protection relations as well as the concept of Europeanization 
itself. Given a certain proliferation of agreements and the lack of a common framework, it could 
give rise to a sort of piecemeal legislation that is built around pivotal governments and agencies, 
rather than centrally coordinated (De Hert & De Shutter, 2008). 
4.  Contents and core provisions: Which core? Which provisions? 
The Prüm Treaty covers a wide range of matters. It promotes the exchange of DNA, fingerprint 
and vehicle registration data (Arts. 2–12). It organises the supply of data for security 
management during major events (Arts. 14–15), as well as the sending of data for anti-terrorism 
purposes (Art. 16). It reinforces police cooperation in the field, allowing for intervention by 
foreign agents within national borders (Arts. 24–32) and the use of ‘air marshals’ (Arts. 17–19). 
It also deals with immigration issues such as repatriations and the control of fake documents 
(Arts. 20–23). The Treaty also provides for an ad hoc data-protection framework, based on 
existing legal instruments (Arts. 33–41). This broad scope of provisions had already been 
subject to reduction in the wording of the first two draft Council Decisions aimed at transposing 
the Treaty within the EU framework (General Secretariat of the Council, 2007a & 2007b). In 
particular, sensitive issues like cooperation on illegal immigration and air marshals were 
withdrawn from the proposed text. The scope of the Treaty was even further reduced between 
February and July 2007 by Council discussions, resulting in the exclusion of Art. 25, “Measures 
in the event of imminent danger”. Since December 2006, some documents
17 as well as officials 
have begun to refer to the transposition of the ‘core parts’ of Prüm. Ex post, the core parts could 
be defined as the provisions coinciding with the text of the Council Decision (Council 2007a; 
Guild, 2007). This covers the articles related to all forms of data exchange, data protection and 
police cooperation. Data exchange provisions were generally considered the most important and 
the most controversial aspects. Yet, it could be difficult to argue that other provisions were not 
originally felt to be part of the ‘core’ or at least important for specific member states and 
agencies. The harsh debates over the inclusion of “Measures in the event of imminent danger” 
                                                      
17 See the Joint Declaration of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom 
of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands, the Republic of Austria, the Portuguese Republic, the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic 
of Finland, on the occasion of the Meeting of Ministers on 5
th December 2006 in Brussels, within the 
framework of the Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in 
combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration (Treaty of Prüm), Brussels, 5 December 
2006. See also Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to the Coreper/Council, 
Integration of (parts of) the Prüm Treaty into the Union Legal Order, Doc. 6003/07 CRIMORG 26 
ENFOPOL 17, Brussels, 5 February 2007(c).  THE 2008 GERMAN–US AGREEMENT ON DATA EXCHANGE | 7 
 
seem to demonstrate this idea, as well as the tendency of member states to sign the Prüm Treaty 
even if some parts were in the process of being adopted at the EU level (Bellanova, 2008). 
Compared with the Council Decision, the transatlantic agreement seems to go a step further in 
the process of lightening the text: the agreement focuses entirely on setting up a system of data 
exchange. Therefore, the agreement has drawn from the very core of Prüm and its specific 
added value – the ‘hit/no hit’ system for sharing DNA and fingerprint data (chapter 2 of the 
Council Decision). One could say that, with two significant exceptions discussed below, all the 
data sharing provisions have been deeply inspired or directly cut and pasted from the 2005 
Prüm text. 
The focus on data sharing could show the significant relevance acquired by such practices and 
forms of cooperation. It also suggests the tendency for the core of the Prüm model to be 
reshaped in order to restrain possible debates with strong actors, such as member states with 
veto powers over adoption at the EU level, or to attract new actors and enter new spheres as in 
the case of transatlantic relations. Moreover, the potential negative aspects of losing some core 
provisions of the 2005 Prüm agreement seem contained by the diffusion of the model across a 
variety of fields. Certain differences could even strengthen the appeal of the model by attracting 
new actors to previous and more complete agreements. Indeed, the contemporary and 
crosscutting presence of the three different legal instruments, with their diverse memberships, 
permit some actors to retain a certain power over multiple and parallel domains. 
5.  Actors and membership 
The last point in the discussion above offers the occasion to identify the main actors involved in 
the Prüm model. The negotiations of the Prüm Treaty developed during the period 2003–05, and 
involved a limited number of member states. Seven countries finally signed the Convention: 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Spain. The last two 
countries had a limited say, however, because they joined the core group only some weeks 
before the signature. This initial membership prompted some critics, and later on many 
supporters, to refer to Prüm as ‘Schengen III’ (Balzacq et al., 2006). According to interviews 
conducted by the author during the preparation of a previous study (Bellanova, 2008), within 
member states the main actors have been the ministries of interior and justice, often supported 
by those of foreign affairs. Apart from them, very few actors have had the possibility to 
intervene officially in the discussions. Data protection authorities were quite marginalised, with 
the partial exception of the German and French authorities (HoL, 2006b). The European 
Commission was even working on a parallel initiative covering the principle of availability 
(European Commission, 2005c). The European Parliament was formally involved only two 
years later, at the time of the presentation of the German initiative in February 2007. Still, since 
its signature in May 2005, Prüm has started to acquire growing attention, as well as critics, from 
a considerable share of the potential stakeholders: EU institutions, European and national data 
protection authorities (AEPD, 2005; CNIL, 2006; EDPS, 2006 & 2007), national parliaments 
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2006) and civil society (Balzacq et al., 2006). Notwithstanding this 
strong interest, only a few actors have had the possibility to retain some power over the entry 
into force of the Treaty or its transposition. For example, the legal structure of decision-making 
under the third pillar weakened the power position of the European Parliament (European 
Parliament, 2007), leaving all the powers of control to national parliaments (Guild & Geyer, 
2008).
18 This concentration of the policy-making in the hands of executive branches and the 
                                                      
18 The legislative initiatives under Title VI of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), “Provisions on 
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”, undergo a process of decision-making that leaves 
to the European Parliament a mere power of consultation. In fact, the adoption of instruments such as 8 | ROCCO BELLANOVA 
 
little room left to parliamentary debates provoked criticism amidst the negotiations, which were 
additionally accused of being held behind “closed doors” (HoL, 2006a). 
All throughout this process, the German government, and notably the ministries of interior and 
justice, seems to have maintained a pivotal position. It was able to capitalise on the interest of 
other governments and institutions, and it showed a strong capacity to present both initiatives as 
the best and only way to further integration. The conclusion of the transatlantic agreement 
seems to reinforce the idea of the great role and ability of the German government in promoting 
the Prüm model. One could also assume that German ministries were the actors that possessed 
the best capacity, and maybe the stronger motivation, to move on and across different issues and 
through different channels. This ability reinforced a powerful position on all the fields. For 
example, one should consider the fact that other member states are concluding similar 
agreements on the exchange of DNA and fingerprint data, implementing the same German 
system of data exchange. Building a parallel system would be both expensive and redundant, 
especially if all potential partners have already accepted and developed a common one. The 
analysis on actors and membership helps to define another feature of the Prüm model: it is not 
just an instrument of governance, but a semi-open configuration of relations among actors and 
fields, originally designed to leave to some actors a major capacity to decide how and when to 
open the structure or to resist external pressures. 
6.  Divergences among the provisions of Prüm instruments 
Before presenting and discussing the resistance to the conclusion of the transatlantic agreement, 
and thus to this segment of the process of extra-territorialisation, it is important to complete the 
tentative sketch of the Prüm model by comparing some key provisions of the three Prüm 
instruments. Such a comparison aims at offering an assessment of new increases in powers 
according to the text of the transatlantic agreement. 
As previously stated, the preamble of the agreement underlines the direct influence of the Prüm 
Treaty.
19 Even so, a close comparison reveals some meaningful differences. In particular, at 
least four other divergences deserve to be mentioned.
20 
The first two divergences highlight the fact that in the last redefinition of the core provisions, 
the powers concerning data exchange increased considerably. 
                                                                                                                                                           
framework decisions (Art. 34(2)(b) TEU), Council decisions (Art. 34(2)(c)) and conventions (Art. 
34(2)(d)) imply only consultation with the European Parliament (Art. 39(1)). For an insightful analysis of 
the modifications to such a scenario under the Lisbon Treaty, see S. Carrera and F. Geyer, “The Reform 
Treaty and Justice and Home Affairs: Implications for the Common Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice”, in E. Guild and F. Geyer (eds), Security vs. Justice? Police and Judicial Cooperation in the 
European Union, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 289–307. 
19 The 4
th para. of the Preamble states, “[f]ollowing the example of the Treaty of Prüm”. 
20 Surely a deeper analysis is needed to detect and assess other divergences. For example, apart from the 
lack of provisions on vehicle registration data, which is obviously linked to geographical evidence, other 
issues that deserve more thorough analysis are the differences entailed in and future implementation of 
DNA-related provisions (Art. 7–9). At present, Art. 24 on “Entry into force” explicitly excludes the 
exchange of DNA data unless implementing agreement(s) have entered into force. Given the extreme 
sensitivity of such data, a real assessment of such provisions can only be done on the basis of 
implementing measures. Here it can just be noted that no automated comparison of DNA and no 
collection of cellular material or supply of DNA profiles (Arts. 4 and 7) are provided for in the text of the 
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•  Art. 10 of the agreement concerns the “Supply of personal and other data in order to 
prevent terrorist offences”. It echoes Art. 16 of both the Prüm Treaty and the Council 
Decision, and profoundly extends its scope. The supply of personal data remains allowed 
even on a spontaneous basis, but the extent and quality of personal data that can be sent is 
greater. To the list of categories of data provided in Art. 16(2) – surnames, first names, 
date and place of birth, description of the circumstances giving rise to the belief of 
terrorism involvement – the following data are added: former names, other names, 
aliases, alternative spelling of names, gender, current and former nationalities, passport 
number, numbers from other identity documents and fingerprint data. Finally, para. 6 also 
partially integrates and extends the scope of the wording of Art. 13 of the Prüm 
Convention, “Supply of non-personal data”. The supply of “[n]on-personal, terrorism-
related data” is no longer limited to the security management of major events.
21 
•  Art. 12 of the agreement covers the “Transmission of Special Categories of Personal 
Data”. This article is completely new and it explicitly admits the possibility, under 
suitable safeguards that seem still to be defined, of providing sensitive data. Even if para. 
1 limits the supply of such data to the stipulation that “only if they are particularly 
relevant to the purposes of (this) Agreement”, it also establishes a very comprehensive 
list of categories of data: “personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions or religious or other beliefs, trade union membership or (concerning) health and 
sexual life”. 
Two further divergences focus on the other aspect of the core provisions of the Prüm model: 
data protection. 
Arts. 11 to 18 of the agreement provide the framework for data protection. Here the Prüm 
Treaty and the Council Decision texts have been a minor source of inspiration. While the data 
protection framework of the Prüm Treaty greatly relies on security and on the architecture of the 
system itself,
22 it also provides a juridical set of references and safeguards, within both national 
and international law (Arts. 34 and 40). In comparison, the new transatlantic agreement focuses 
even more on a (future) technical approach to security with the risk of marginalising juridical 
guarantees. This could be linked to the different juridical and institutional approaches to data 
protection on the two sides of Atlantic (Council of the European Union, 2008d) and merits 
further and deeper analysis. Nevertheless, it is possible to point out at least two differences, 
more specifically two elements that are lacking in the new text. 
•  Art. 40 of the Prüm Treaty, literally translated into Art. 31 of the Council Decision, 
defines the data subjects’ rights to information and damages. Among these rights, only 
that concerning the data subjects’ right of access has been maintained in the transatlantic 
text. The second part of Art. 40(1), providing for the possibility to lodge a complaint to 
“an independent court or a tribunal” is not present. Furthermore, the rights of access of 
the para. 1 of Art. 17 are severely limited by a series of exceptions listed in para. 2.
23 
•  The second difference is the lack of reference to the role of data protection authorities. 
Indeed, in reading Art. 15(1) one could wonder whether this lack of reference is not part 
                                                      
21 See Art. 10(6) of the US–Germany Agreement. 
22 See the Prüm Treaty, chapter 7, in particular Arts. 37–39 as well as the provisions on the automated 
search system for DNA and fingerprints in chapter 2. 
23 Art. 17(2) states, “[s]uch information may be denied in accordance with the respective laws of the 
Parties, including if providing this information may jeopardise: (a.) the purposes of the processing; (b.) 
investigations or prosecutions conducted by the competent authorities in the US or by the competent 
authorities in Germany; or (c.) the rights and freedoms of third parties”. 10 | ROCCO BELLANOVA 
 
of a shift of power in favour of government agencies. For example, the provisions of Art. 
15 set up “a record of the transmission and receipt of data communicated to the other 
party”. More precisely, this record shall serve not only to ensure the effective monitoring 
of data protection and data security, as is the case in the texts of the Prüm Treaty and the 
Council Decision, but also to “enable the Parties to effectively make use of the rights 
granted to them according to Articles 14 and 18”. The rights of Arts. 14 and 18, 
“Correction, blockage and deletion of data” and “Information”, are state agency rights 
and not explicitly those of independent authorities. 
It is worth remembering that these divergences could stem from the specific nature of US 
legislation (De Hert & Bellanova, 2008, pp. 13–20). Still, the apparent shift in the powers of 
control and supervision as well as the reduced set of data subjects’ rights highlight once again 
the difficulties of reaching agreements on data access and exchange with the US in the absence 
of a European and transatlantic framework for data protection covering data used for security 
purposes. Therefore, the decision to continue the process of extra-territorialisation seems 
strongly motivated by the will to reinforce the capabilities of state and law enforcement 
agencies. 
7.  Resistance to the ‘Prüm model’? 
On the basis of an initial round of interviews, published documents and press releases, it is 
possible to identify a primary layer of resistance to the ratification and entry into force of the 
transatlantic agreement. At the time of writing, German actors are animating the main points of 
resistance: several political parties, some trade unions, the federal data protection authority and 
an association of German civil rights and privacy activists. Such a picture is clearly not 
exhaustive for three reasons: the documentation is still poor and generally not translated, and 
direct interviews require a longer period of research; the research is focused on Germany, 
because a preliminary overview of US sources has brought few if any results; finally, other 
layers of resistance, especially legal constraints, could arise later. 
As was the case when the Prüm Treaty was concluded and later when the Council Decision was 
first adopted, the main line of possible resistance is national parliaments. Notably, it is the 
German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) that is called upon to discuss and ratify the 
transatlantic agreement. The assent of the US Congress does not seem to be called for by the 
legal form of the agreement, nor is modification to the present legislation required. 
According to an interview with the legislative assistant to the Free Democratic Party (FDP) 
speaker for policy and the interior,
24 all the parties making up the opposition in the German 
parliament have voiced criticism of the government initiative. The FDP and the Green Party 
have separately lodged a motion with the government. The motion of the FDP concentrates on 
seven shortcomings of the transatlantic agreement and asks the government to intervene on six 
points (Deutscher Bundestag, 2008). The shortcomings refer to the lowering of data protection 
guarantees if compared with the Prüm Treaty, as related to the US legal framework of data 
protection as well as the negotiating atmosphere of closed doors and government denials to the 
national parliament. Indeed, according to the same interview, even if the German Bundestag has 
no explicit right to be associated with international negotiations, it nonetheless has a right to be 
correctly informed. The government infringed this right earlier when it had been asked about 
negotiations with the US on data sharing and it denied any activity. Among the points raised, 
                                                      
24 Derived from an interview with Maja Pfister, Legislative Assistant to Gisela Piltz (MP), Speaker for 
Policy of the Interior in the Parliamentary Group of the FDP in the Deutscher Bundestag, 29 October 
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the most important ones are proposals of amendment to the text, with a view to improving data 
protection, limiting the exchange of sensitive data, specifying the purpose of the agreement and 
keeping the parliament informed. 
Despite the resistance of opposition parties, the present government’s parliamentary support can 
overcome any opposition by a number of votes. According to the above-quoted interview, the 
potential of the opposition to inspire greater numerical resistance to the agreement could 
advance if the trade unions continue their critical posture towards the agreement and lobby 
members of parliament with the Social Democratic Party (SDP). At present, the SDP is part of 
the coalition government, but it is highly sensitive to the pressures coming from trade unions. 
As previously stated, Art. 12 of the transatlantic agreement leaves open the possibility of 
transmitting sensitive data, including trade union membership. Discussion in the media and 
among trade unions about this article could become a driver of pressure on SDP members. 
Even if no official report has been released by the German federal data protection authority, in a 
press release (BFDI, 2008) on the day that the agreement was signed, its president stressed the 
insufficient level of data protection in the agreement: “[D]ata protection remains far below the 
level which is [a] common standard when transferring data within Europe…an independent data 
protection control is missing, and rules on purpose limitation are insufficient.” The way in 
which the exchange of sensitive data is conceived is also lamented. An interview with the Data 
Protection and Freedom of Information Commissioner of Berlin, Alexander Dix, has 
highlighted the same concerns, adding to them criticism of the “illusion” of the exchange of 
legal data protection with technological data security, the tendency towards a maximisation of 
data exchange and the principal problem of decision-making behind closed doors.
25 
The last actor opposing resistance to the transatlantic agreement is the Arbeitskreis 
Vorratsdatenspeicherung [Working Group on Data Retention], an association of German civil 
rights and privacy activists. They were the first to publish the German version of the 
transatlantic agreement (in September 2008), and they have started a civil society campaign on 
this issue.
26 Their criticism centres on the lowering of data protection standards and the 
shortcomings of the US system of data and human rights protection.
27 They also identify several 
defaults on “basically all of the preconditions set out by the German Constitutional Court for 
interferences with…basic rights”.
28 They are asking the national parliament not to ratify the 
agreement, and in the event that ratification occurs, they plan to challenge it before the Federal 
Constitutional Court.
29 This last strand of opposition is particularly relevant in the study of 
resistance to security measures based on data access and their extra-territorialisation. 
Notwithstanding an apparent silence on the other side of the Atlantic in this specific case, 
generally non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the US are very active in promoting 
resistance to such security measures, using communication and legal instruments (Bennett, 
2008). In contrast, Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung’s activities are one of the few 
European examples. 
                                                      
25 Derived from an interview with Alexander Dix, Berliner Beauftragter für Datenschutz und 
Informationsfreiheit, 29 October 2008. 
26 See “Alarming secret German deal on disclosure of personal data to the US published 2008-09-25”, 
Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung [German Working Group on Data Retention] (retrieved from 
http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/content/view/253/1/lang,de/). 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Derived from an interview with Patrick Breyer, a jurist and member of the Arbeitskreis 
Vorratsdatenspeicherung, 3 November 2009. 12 | ROCCO BELLANOVA 
 
According to this first overview of resistance, it is important to note that several issues raised by 
‘resistant actors’ are not dissimilar to those raised at the time of transposing parts of the Prüm 
Treaty within the EU legal framework. They both focus on the content (data protection, scope 
and aim of the instrument) and on the decision-making process (the behind-closed-doors style). 
Moreover, different actors voice the same criticisms, even if they propose different solutions, 
ranging from the renegotiation of the agreement to its non-ratification. The main novelty of 
these strands of resistance is the diffusion of the opposition, owing to the entry of new actors 
(such as NGOs) and to a critical posture of other actors (such as trade unions). Every actor has 
specific powers and limitations, as highlighted above in the case of parliamentary opposition. 
Even so, as interviews seem to confirm, flows of communication and expertise among them 
could play a role in linking their stances across various fields. 
8.  Final considerations and recommendations 
The success of the Prüm model could confirm the initial hypothesis that security measures 
based on data access are also an occasion for some actors to increase their power in several 
fields. Moreover, the case study highlights parallelism and overlap with variable geometry 
governance. Both can act as a catalyst with respect to pending European and transatlantic issues. 
In spite of strong political and juridical appeal, such reconfigurations of power relations can 
ultimately risk creating distortions that are detrimental to the values and the forms of European 
integration: a lowering of citizens’ privacy and data protection rights, limited and scattered 
supervision of executive powers by independent authorities and parliaments, and ping-pong 
multilateralism as a shortcut for the diffusion of norms and policies. 
This overview has also underlined that the Prüm model is not a fixed structure or package of 
provisions. While some provisions remain the same, the core is partially reshaped every time it 
generates a new legal instrument, by the subtraction of contested parts or enlargement of others. 
Yet, nothing is completely lost for those actors that are able to move along the different fields 
and levels – international, European and transatlantic. On the contrary, this could reinforce their 
position in every field because they can move across them. It is also worth stressing that the 
Prüm model remains a highly symbolic, political form of cooperation rather than an already 
working measure. Regardless of its proliferation in several frameworks, its implementation is 
still not complete even among the ‘founding members’. 
Drawing from these final considerations, three sets of recommendations can be addressed to the 
actors involved: 
1)  At the launch of a new instrument, it is of overall importance to perceive and understand 
the main changes in terms of content, contexts and relations among the stakeholders. 
Every change, even if apparently minor, deserves close attention, because it is not without 
consequences and it risks triggering a different status quo in the related fields of 
fundamental rights, Europeanization and transatlantic relations. 
2)  The tendency towards a proliferation of security measures aimed at widening the extent 
of accessible data clashes with the ideas of both data minimisation (focusing on the 
quality, pertinence and necessity of data access) and simplification (clear rules on 
procedures and easily recognisable rights). These criteria should be of primary relevance 
for all the stakeholders, their interests and their activities. A more open structure of 
decision-making coupled with sound assessments of what is needed and what is at 
disposal could prove a step forward. Finally, further European coordination in 
transatlantic relations would limit the ping-pong multilateralism and its negative 
consequences. THE 2008 GERMAN–US AGREEMENT ON DATA EXCHANGE | 13 
 
3)  Given the linkage between security measures and other key issues such as visas, other 
political priorities can play in favour of a rapid adoption of similar agreements within 
different national settings. These factors contribute to diffusing a model that, de facto, 
undermines resistance and possible amendments in other countries. Thus, to avoid this 
sort of self-fulfilling process and the relative marginalisation of layers of resistance, 
concerned actors should foster their ability to create new configurations of relations to 
retain their powers of decision and supervision. This point seems particularly important in 
the light of the future decision-making structure under the Lisbon Treaty, where closer 
collaboration between the European Parliament and national parliaments could become a 
major asset in reaffirming their roles. 
 14 | 
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